Who feels Belgian first and foremost? Or not in the least? Is there such a thing as a Flemish identity? In Lieven de Winter's opinion 'la Flandre profonde' is fighting a rearguard action.

Two thousand well-known and lesser known Dutch-language Belgians ( referred to as 'la Flandre profonde' by chairman Storme, at the RBTF), held a meeting last Sunday for Flemish independence.

Ivan Mertens, chairman of the Flemish Popular Movement, stated that most Dutch-language Belgians are already separatist, but are as yet unaware of it. (DS 14 November). Its members see themselves as spearheading the Flemish struggle for liberation, but are in fact engaged in fighting a rearguard action, which is of little interest to the majority of Dutch-language Belgians.

Indeed, about ten scientifically based public opinion polls have shown a shift in attitude of Dutch-language citizens towards Flanders and Belgium during the period 1975-1996 (for a review see De Winter, in Swyngedouw et al De (on)redelijke kiezer, Acco, Leuven, 1998).

Until the beginning of the eighties, a relative majority regarded itself first and foremost as being Flemish, compared to a minority, who regarded itself first and foremost as being Belgian. Since then the situation has made an about-turn and the trend continues, with the latest poll (1996) showing that those who initially identified with Belgium have doubled in number, as opposed to those who initially identified with Flanders.

Responses to a whole series of questions about attitude also show an attachment to the Belgian identity which in no way interferes with experiencing a Flemish identity. Only 4% regard themselves as being exclusively Flemish, 23% regard themselves as being more Flemish than Belgian, 45% regard themselves as being Flemish and Belgian to an equal degree, 17% regard themselves as being more Belgian than Flemish, and 11 % regard themselves as being exclusively Belgian.

The study by Cambré, commissioned by the Flemish government (1996), shows that two out of every three Dutch-language Belgians explicitly define Flanders as a part of Belgium, and that more than 70% of Dutch-language Belgians regard themselves as Belgians but also as Dutch-language Belgians, because they happened to be born in Flanders. Almost six out of every ten find the distinction between Dutch-language Belgians and the Walloons overdone.

Furthermore, the ISPO investigation (1996) shows that Flemish points of conflict such as 'striving for Flemish independence' and 'the division of social security', are only of interest to a mere handful of Dutch-language Belgians, unlike non-community issues such as unemployment, pensions, taxes, security and political corruption.

There is also a high level of ignorance regarding new Flemish institutions and authorities. Furthermore, the Belgian policy level is usually regarded as the most suitable for solving a number of important social problems, with Flanders often in third place after Belgium or Europe!

These and many other investigative results show that an increasing number of Dutch-language Belgians are not at all of the opinion that Belgium should be left to its own devices.

This, in spite of the great progress that has been made in federalising this country, the forming of our own Flemish political institutions whose policy is aimed at strengthening the Flemish identity, the constant plea by the Flemish government and parliament, the Flemish Movement, most of the political parties and a section of the media for the further dismantling of the federal state, as well as the steady decline in relations between Dutch-language and French-speaking Belgians which only strengthens the mutual lack of understanding and mistrust.

How does one explain this new political rift between the Flemish elite (or an important part of it) and Flemish public opinion? Of course the strong identification of Dutch-language Belgians with Flanders in the mid-eighties has to do with the historical evolution of the balance of power between the two language communities.

When the Belgian state came into being, French was the dominant language. The Flemish Movement quite rightly agitated against this. Naturally the discrimination against Dutch throughout history made identification of the Dutch-language population with this 'TAALVREEMDE STAAT' more difficult.

It is not surprising that in spite of language legislation in 1963 and cultural autonomy in 1970, followed by other state reforms which have to a great extent met the original demands made by the Flemish Movement, it took a few decades before anti-Belgian identities within the population started to fade.

Consequently there is a certain amount of catching up to be done with regard to collective awareness and the actual changes that have taken place in the in the language distribution and balance of power between Dutch-language Belgians and those speaking other languages. This is confirmed by the fact that the number of those who feel exclusively Flemish increase with age.

This contrast between the generations is probably strongest amongst the politically elite. The top jobs at federal, regional and community levels are all held by a generation which has been politically socialised by events which took place in the sixties and seventies, the hottest years of the struggle between Flemish and French-speaking communities (language legislation, Louvain Flemish, the success of federalist parties).

This is why this political generation, as well as most Dutch-language critics, tend to react more aggressively at a community level, demanding more and more autonomy. It is clear that this generation will be in power for long enough to bring about new state reforms and enter into further confrontations with French-speaking Belgians.

Moreover, it has created its own political institutions, which in their turn enable the elite to validate their raison d'étrê, by drawing attention to their own achievements on the one hand, and blaming their failure or impotence on the unwillingness of French-speaking Belgians and the consumption federalism of the Walloons, on the other.

One might ask oneself how the hostile images held up by Flemish pioneers can be combined with the striving for a united Europe, based on economic solidarity and mutual cultural respect between nations, whose differences far exceed those existing between Dutch-language and French-speaking Belgians. How can Dutch-language Belgians possibly become European if they can't even manage to live together with other Belgians?

It is up to the younger generation, who are as yet only mildly infected with the nationalistic virus, to decide between fully exploiting the richness of our multicultural Belgian society and like Axelle Red, conquering the world, or to complacently shut themselves up in an imaginary Flemish identity (feeding on banner-waving and Flemish television junk).

Lieven de Winter

(The author is a lecturer at Louvain University and Brussels University.)